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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The plaintiffs and Appellants will be referred to as 
appellants or in their own names, and defendants and re-
spondents will be referred to collectively as respondents or 
individually in their own names. 
All italics are ours. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondents, in their brief, by Point 1, raise issues 
which they did not give as grounds for their motion for 
summary judgment. The trial court did not state the 
grounds in the order granting summary judgment. The plain-
tiffs and appellants must presume that the court searched 
the complaint only, and therefrom determined that there 
were no triable issues of fact, since it was not entitled to 
search the depositions for evidence. There were no affidav-
its filed by either party. Rule 26 (f), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 provides: 
"At the trial or hearing any party may REBUT 
any relevant evidence contained in a deposition 
whether introduced by him or by any other party." 
ARGUMENT 
Respondents argue that there was no agreement between 
the parties to appeal. They argue issues. If there is argument, 
it should be to a trial court and not be decided by summary 
judgment. Appellants maintain there was an express agree-
ment for the appeal by respondents. The exact percentage 
respondents should receive was to be less than 1/3 per 
cent of the recovery. Did the agreement fail for uncertain· 
ty? We think not. 
7 C.J.S. 1063, notes 43 and 46, the law is properly 
stated: 
"Contingent fee agreements are valid in the ab-
sence of fraud or imposition, where they are fair and 
reasonable as to the client and an agreement of this 
kind is not objectionable for want of mutuality, or for 
UNCERTAINTY." 
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In the case of Moore v. Stanfill, 81 S.W. 2d 610 the 
court said: 
"A contract providing that the compensation 
shall not exceed a certain limit leaves the amount to 
be determined on a quantum meruit within such lim-
its." See also 7 C.J.S. p. 848, Note 53 exact com-
pensation not stated; 45 A.L.R. P. 14. 
Respondent, on page 7, asks whether the contract was 
with LeGrand P. Backman or his law firm. The answer 
is, the agreement can be enforced or damages may be re-
ceived against LeGrand P. Backman or any member of his 
firm. 
7 C.J.S. P. 986, Section 150 states the law: 
"Members of a law firm are individually liable 
for negligence of partner to the client." 
On page 9, respondents state, "In the instant case the 
burden is on appellants TO PROVE the agreement of em-
ployment and respondent's negligence." That requires a 
trial to try those issues. It cannot Le decided by summary, 
judgment. 
Much is said about the payment of costs, or the failure 
of appellants to pay the costs of appeal. It is pleaded in the 
amended complaint that respondents did not ask appellants 
for advancement of costs at the time the agreement to appeal 
was entered into. They had no idea what the costs were or 
when they should be paid, except for respondent's statement 
they would be about $100.00. They had the right to rely up-
on their attorney, and were able, ready and willing to 
pay the costs upon demand, which they did. This is an issue 
of fact to be proved at the trial. 
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Summary judgment is a harsh remedy and merely sup-
posed to search the record in the same manner as does a 
general demurrer and is supported by the authorities for the 
purpose of finding a FAULT IN PLEADINGS. Marie A. 
Sullivan v. State of Wisconsin, 251 N. W. 251; City Trust 
Co. v. Anthony Ricci Realty Co. ,137 Misc. 128, 241 N.Y.S. 
481; Tauber v. National Surety C. 219 Appp Div. 253, 219 
N.Y. Supp. 387. 
If there is a fatal defect in Appellant's amended com-
plaint, appellants should have an opportunity to correct the 
defect if they can. 
"Summary judgment must be denied when the defendant 
has taken issue with every material allegation in the com-
plaint thereby raising an issue to be tried." 91 A.L.R. P. 
879. 
"Summary judgment does not provide a substitute for 
existing methods in determination of issues of fact." Walsh 
v. Walsh 116 P 2d 62, 18 Cal. 2d 439, Gibson v. De La Salle 
Institute 152 P 2d 77 4, 66 Cal. App. 2d 609. 
PRESUMPTION 
"There is authority for the view that there is a pre-
sumption that an attorney of record for a party in the lower 
court has authority to take an appeal. ( 1) Some cases hold 
that where a notice of appeal is filed by an attorney, the pre-
sumption is that he had authority to take such action (see 
cases) ( 2) Such presumption can be overcome only by clear 
proof. (see cases )7 CJS P. 881, Note 70. It seems from 
the above that respondents would have to disprove this pre-
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sumption upon trial, the presumption going to the existence 
of an agreement to appeal as they could have authority to 
appeal on behalf of appellants only by agreement. 
LACHES 
"The defense of laches exists only where there has been 
such a delay in the assertion of a claim as naturally TO 
PREJUDICE him against whom the claim is set up." 7 A. 
L.R. 1014, McClure v. Northrop, 93 Conn 558, 106 A 504, 
See Permanent A.L.R. Digest Vol. 8, P 208, Sec. 7.5 ( 1). 
Respondents claim as a defense laches, without having shown 
in their answer that they were placed at a disadvantage by 
such delay. If there was any delay by appellants in bring-
ing this action, it was because of respondent's deceit and 
fraudulent concealment of their, plaintiff's and appellant's, 
cause of action against them, as alleged in the amended 
complaint. The defense of the running of the Statute of 
Limitations cannot be claimed by respondents because of 
their fraudulent concealment. Hicock Producing & De-
velopment Co. Vs. Texas Co. 128 Fed. 2d 183, 173 A.L.R. 
583, 54 CJS 219 Note 27 Cites the Utah case, Atty. Gen. of 
Utah v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P 2d 1277. The pre-
vailing rule is: 
"Where relationship is fiduciary or confiden-
tial, the person occupying the relation of fiduciary or 
of confidence is under a duty to reveal the facts to the 
plaintiff (the other party) and that his silence when 
he ought to speak, or his failure to disclose what he 
ought to disclose, is as much a fraud at law as an 
actual affirmative false representation or act, and 
that mere silence on his part as to a cause of action, 
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the facts giving rise to which it was his duty to dis-
close, amounts to a fraudulent concealment within the 
rule under consideration." 173 A.L.R. 588 Sec. 13, 
Sec. 26 on pages 604-605; Fortune v. English, 226 
Ill. 262, 89 N.E. 781, 12 L.R.A. NS 1005. 
Respondents, apparently, were afraid to inform appel-
lants of their failure to appeal, as they had agreed to do, and 
then of the dismissal of appellant's appeal lest appellants be 
made aware of their cause of action against them for their 
negligence in failing to apeal on time and to otherwise per-
fect the appeal. 
On page 12 of respondent's brief, respondents compare 
the many acts of kindness of Kostopulos with the friendship 
of the Bridges. It is true that Kostopulos was nearly a slave to 
Wilda Gail Swan, but the trial court found that Kostopulos 
was present when the second codicil was signed (Finding 
No. 23) but that the Bridges were not (Findings No. 28 and 
33). That make the difference in law. Lavelle's Estate, 
248 p 2d 372. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. There was an express agreement between respon-
dents and appellants to appeal. 
2. Where there is a top limit specified as attorney's 
fee without stating the exact amount, the fee will be de-
termined by the court and the agreement is not void because 
of uncertainty. 
3. Appellants amended complaint states a cause of 
action against respondents, and respondents having denied all 
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the allegations contained therein, raised issues of fact to be 
tried. 
4. Summary judgment is a harsh remedy and mere-
ly takes the place of a general demurrer for the purpose of 
finding defects in the amended complaint. 
5. The trial court erred in that it did not specify the 
grounds upon which it entered summary judgment. 
6. Laches or statute of limitations have not run 
against appellants because of the fraudulent concealment 
and deceit of respondents. 
7. Appellants should be entitled to amend their amend-
ed complaint to cure any defect found in their said amended 
complaint. 
We respectfully submit that this Honorable Court should 
determine the question of whether or not it would have re-
versed the trial court in the Hendee case had respondents 
properly perfected appellant's appeal, set aside the summary 
judgment herein and direct that the matter be tried. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN Y. RICHARDS 
Counsel for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
313 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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